摘要
随着国际交流的深入,"出国热"日益升温。国家公派出国留学作为出国留学的主体部分依然占据重要地位,并继续发挥着巨大作用。运用新制度经济学的委托代理理论,对我国公派出国留学的委托代理关系的特殊性进行了研究,分析了其双重的委托代理关系及存在的"道德风险";结合我国实际,提出了降低国家公派出国留学"道德风险"的建议,即继续坚持"三个一流"的选派政策,加强对出境后的公派出国人员的管理与沟通,建立过程性评价机制、激励机制、监督和约束机制,旨在促进我国公派出国留学事业更快更好地发展。
With the widened and deepened international communication, the upsurge of studying abroad for academic pursuits comes to light nowadays in China. Among the students studying abroad, the government-sponsored students are the majority and the hard core of them. Based on the principal-agent theory from the new institutional economics, the peculiarity of the government-sponsored students in the dual principal-agent relationship and its ＂moral hazard＂ are explored. To improve and expedite the project to send government-sponsored students to study abroad for academic pursuits, some suggestions are given based on China＇s actuality, such as the elite policy that the students to be sent, the specialties to major and the tutors for graduates should all be of first grade, the uninterrupted contact and supervision for the students sent and the construction of process evaluation mechanism and incentive system, as well as the supervision and restraint system to those students, aiming at a better and faster development.
出处
《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期347-350,共4页
Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)
基金
教育部2008年度全国教育科学"十一五"规划课题(FIB080427)
关键词
委托代理理论
政府
派出机构
出国人员
回归率
the principal-agent theory
government
assigning agencies
students studying abroad
ratio of returning overseas scholars
