摘要
以往研究认为,旅游资源"公共地悲剧"治理的途径主要有两种,即明晰产权和政府干预,但是,基于产权界定和产权安排所进行的旅游资源"公共地悲剧"和"反公共地悲剧"分析,关注的是既定产权结构下经营者之间的博弈关系及结果,仅从资源所有者、经营者权利角度关注公共旅游资源悲剧和相关制度选择,却忽视了不同治理模式所界定的不同利益分配格局下经营者行为及其对资源开发效果的全面分析。本文从经济性角度将旅游资源分为基础性和经营性两种内生性生产要素,通过分析不同合约结构下经营者的行为探讨分析了旅游资源经营过程中可能出现的各种现象。分析结果表明,即便政府干预旅游资源的经营,也未必能够保证旅游资源的合理开发和有效利用;在合适的合约结构和激励机制下,市场经营也未必会破坏旅游资源,有效的合约结构和利益分配格局可以在更为实际的操作层面上解决旅游资源开发和经营中的具体问题。因此,就关于旅游资源开发和经营的研究而言,当务之急是认真研究各种制度的激励与约束机制,用科学的态度、踏实的实证方法来研究市场经营和政府干预环境下经营者的激励与约束机制及其对旅游资源开发和经营效率与局限的影响,从更为现实的角度来研究旅游资源开发和经营中的具体问题和解决方法。
Previous studies have relied on two ways to address the problem of ＂Tragedy of the Commons＂ in the development and management of tourism resources, either by defining property rights or through government intervention. However, many discussions of property rights are too simplistic, especially in the context of China＇s present management system of tourism resources, because there are not enough relevant laws to regulate the behavior of tourism operators. Thus, separating operation rights and ownership rights becomes just an institutional definition, and cannot contribute to improving the efficiency of tourism resource exploitation. Furthermore, complex benefit relationships make the phenomenon of ＂ Tragedy of the Commons＂ more serious and long-lasting. Another problem associated with tourism resource development is related to governance. Former studies on the ＂ Tragedy of the Commons＂ and ＂Tragedy of the Anti-commons＂ mainly focused on the game theory process and the results among different operators under established structure of property rights, but these studies ignored operator behavior and performance under different governance modes. Behavior of tourism resource operators varies under different types of governance, and exploitation outcomes are also different. In fact, only an effective governance mode can result in effective utilization of tourism resources. In different governance modes, the operator＇s behavior varies with different incentive mechanisms under different contract forms, and this can lead to the overuse or underdevelopment of tourism resources. We call the former phenomenon ＂ Quasi-Tragedy of the Commons ＂ and the latter ＂Quasi- Tragedy of the Anti- commons＂ We divide tourism resources into two kinds of endogenous production elements from the economic angle, infrastructure factors and operational factors. When these are integrated, the tourism operator provides both infrastructure and operational factors. In the situation of non-integration, the government provides the infrastructure factor and the tourism operator provides the operational factor. According to the structure of profit distribution between the government and the operator, two contact forms are possible： a fixed contract, and a share contract. Under the fixed contract, the operator＇s overexploitation of tourism resources will lead to ＂ Quasi-Tragedy of the Commons ＂ But under the share contract, the cost of developing tourism resources will be divided between the government and operator, and ＂Quasi- Tragedy of the Commons＂ and ＂ Quasi-Tragedy of the Anti-commons＂ will convert easily under some conditions. This analysis indicates that government intervention cannot assure the proper exploitation of tourism resources. However, with a feasible contract structure and proper incentive mechanisms, marketing operations may not. destroy tourism resources. For research on exploitation and operation of tourism resources, the most important thing is analyzing diverse incentives and restrictive mechanisms under different institutions, since simply exploring the definition of property rights cannot solve the problem of ＂ Tragedy of the Commons ＂ Additional study on the actual governance mode of tourism resource development may help to provide some effective solutions.
出处
《资源科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第8期1176-1183,共8页
Resources Science
基金
上海高校选拔培养优秀青年教师科研专项基金项目(编号:79001301)
关键词
旅游资源
“类公共地悲剧”
“类反公共地悲剧”
Tourism Resources, Governance, Tragedy of the Commons, Tragedy of the Anti-commons
