摘要
利用委托—代理关系分析公共权力的授予机构政府机关(委托人)与税务部门(代理人)在信息不对称条件下可能产生的买税腐败行为,揭示腐败可能产生的原因,通过委托人与代理人的博弈模型分析了代理人的选择问题。依据该模型分析可以较好地解释全球经济条件下各国买税行为中委托—代理关系可能产生的腐败问题。
Based on the relationship of entrust-act, we analyzes the corruption between the tax office （agent） and the organization government of giving public power （client） under information inadequacy. In order to explain the reason for the corruption, we analyzes the agent＇s choice problem mainly by the model of countermeasure between the client and agent. This model is formed by the basic standpoint of information economics and theo- ries of encouragement. A few conclusions, which are used to effectively explain the corruption problem in relation to entrust-act, can be drawn using this model.
出处
《广西工学院学报》
CAS
2007年第3期116-119,122,共5页
Journal of Guangxi University of Technology
