摘要
文章首先对“一把手”腐败问题从委托代理角度进行分析,指出在现行官员体制下,一把手上下级之间是特殊的代理链,代理链往上看时是单线的,往下看时则是放射状的,代理的效率关键取决于一把手。接着,本文建立了一个上下级官员之间的博弈模型,对腐败的相关因素进行了分析,认为应对官员选择适当的工资水平而不是高薪养廉,对上级监督腐败进行激励和约束,加大对腐败行为的惩罚,降低监督成本,完善市场竞争机制。
This thesis analyses the corruption of number one leaders with principal - agent theory. The author holds that in current system, there is a special chain between the upgrade and downgrade officials of the number one leaders. In this chain, it is linear when looked upward, however, when looked downward , it becomes radiant, the agency efficiency lies on the upgrade number one leaders. And then, the paper constructs a game model between the upgrade and the downgrade officials, trying to analyze some facts related to corruption. The conclusions show that, to prevent corruption, an appropriate wage level instead of high wage should be chosen, motivating and constraining the upgrade leaders to supervise, strengthen the punishment on corruption, reducing the cost of supervising, improving market competition system.
出处
《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2003年第z1期6-11,共6页
Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
'一把手'
腐败
经济学
corruption
economic analysis
number one leaders
