摘要
博弈论为理论依据,通过对高、低两种任务下买税利益团体和上级监管部门的利益偏好和行为特征进行建模对比分析,考察影响其行为的各种因素,从经济学角度探求引起“买税”行为的根源,并试着给出建议.
We try to find out the reason why the problem of ＂buying tax＂ has been many years in China and give some advices. With the help of game theory, this paper analyses the interest preference, characteristical of behaviors of two interest parties relating to ＂buying tax＂, including buyer and supervisor, explores all factors influencing the behaviors by modeling and contrasting at two different cases, high and low taxing task.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第12期37-43,共7页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
关键词
买税
博弈论
财政体制
buying tax
game theory
finance system
