摘要
煤矿企业的所有者与企业中负责进行安全投资的决策者构成委托代理关系,煤矿企业的所有者是委托人,安全投资的决策者是代理人。本文从安全投资决策者具有机会主义行为倾向的角度出发,构建了基于代理人具有机会主义行为倾向的委托代理模型。通过分析认为代理人机会主义行为倾向有损委托人的利益。通过激励强度的提高可以达到降低代理人机会主义行为倾向的目的。
Principal-agent relationship is constituted between the owner of the coal mine enterprise and the decision maker of the safety investment, the owner of the coal mine enterprise is the principal and the decision maker of the safety investment is the agent. From the perspective of the agent＇s opportunism behavior tendency, a principal-agent model was established in this paper. By analysis, it is believed that the agent＇s opportunism behavior tendency will undermine the principal＇s interests. By enhancing the strength of the incentive mechanism, the goal of decreasing the agent＇ s opportunism behavior tendency would be achieved.
出处
《中国安全生产科学技术》
CAS
2007年第5期30-34,共5页
Journal of Safety Science and Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金(编号:70673079)资助
关键词
机会主义
委托代理
激励
opportunism
principal-agent
incentive
