摘要
技术创新是企业获得持续发展的先决条件,但在信息不对称的条件下,控股股东和中小股东之间会产生严重的委托代理问题,产生控股股东价值与企业价值的冲突,冲突关系进而会影响企业创新技术的选择与创新技术投资的效率。分析了企业技术创新投资过程中控股股东与中小股东的代理关系,构造实物期权模型分析控股股东代理(控股股东的存在)对企业创新技术选择的影响。研究表明,只有当企业投资的项目现金流达到一定值的时候,存在控股股东的企业才会选择不确定性的创新技术投资,此前都会选择确定性的技术投资。
Innovation is the key condition of development of corporation, but on the condition of asymmetry information, the principle-agent relationship between controlling shareholder and minor shareholders could be come into being and the conflict will take place. The principle-agent relationship can affect the innovation technology selection and innovation efficiency. In this paper, the principle-agent relationship between controlling and minor shareholdem is analyzed, and the real option model is set up to analyze the effect of controlling shareholder agent on the selection of innovation. The research shows that the uncertainty technology will be selected when the cash flow add up to a certain value, else other the certainty technology will be selected.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
2007年第1期59-63,共5页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(70372041)
关键词
技术创新
控股股东
委托代理
投资
technology innovation
controlling shareholders
principal-agent
investment
