摘要
利用简单线性函数模型,本文证明,当独立下游企业的生产效率不低于垂直一体化企业下游部门时,一体化企业确定的最优接入价格并不必然高于独立上游瓶颈设施企业确定的最优接入价格,这意味着此时不一定存在垂直排斥问题。如果垂直一体化企业下游部门比独立下游企业生产效率较高,一体化企业就具有垂直排斥独立下游企业的激励,并且效率差距越大,垂直排斥的激励程度越大,但利润最大化的一体化企业并不会完全将竞争对手驱逐出下游市场。
Use a simple linear functions model, this paper show that if the efficiency of downstream rivals is not lower than the downstream branch of the vertical integrated firm, the optimal access price settled by the vertical integrated firm is not always higher than the optimal access price that would be settled by a independent upstream monopolist, this means that there will be not always vertical foreclosure. If the efficiency of the downstream branch of the vertical integrated firm is higher than downstream rivals, the vertical integrated firm will have the incentive to foreclose downstream rivals through access pricing, and the more that the difference of the efficiency, the more possible of vertical foreclosure, but in order to get maximum profit, the vertical integrated firm does not entirely drives rivals out the downstream market.
出处
《产业经济研究》
2006年第6期15-22,共8页
Industrial Economics Research
基金
教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目"网络瓶颈与接入规制:一般理论
国际比较与政策设计"(项目批准号:05JJD630031)的阶段性成果
关键词
网络产业
接入定价
垂直一体化
垂直排斥
network industries
access pricing
vertical integration
vertical foreclosure
