摘要
自然垄断产业引入竞争后,瓶颈垄断厂商的拒绝接入是一种典型的策略性行为,它意在维护纵向一体化垄断、限制下游市场竞争。而行政垄断势力对瓶颈垄断的支持,则会使拒绝接入进一步固化。理论分析表明,拒绝接入会导致自然垄断产业下游竞争性市场关闭和市场化改革倒退,因此需要以接入规制来促进竞争。由于转型期的瓶颈垄断还具有深厚的行政垄断体制基础,因此接入规制的有效性还仰仗于打破政企不分式的行政垄断。
After competition is introduced in natural monopoly industries,access reject is a typical strategic behavior of the bottleneck monopoly firms,which intend to maintain the monopoly in the vertical-integration market and limit the competition in the downstream market.The support of administrative monopoly power to bottleneck monopoly may reinforce the access-reject.Theoretical analyses show that access-reject may lead to the close of downstream competitive market in the natural monopoly industries and the ret...
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第6期21-24,共4页
Economic Survey
基金
湖北省教育厅科学研究计划中青年项目(Q20091904)
湖北经济学院青年科研基金项目(XJ2009006)的阶段性成果
关键词
瓶颈
行政垄断
拒绝接入
接入规制
反垄断法
bottleneck
administrative monopoly
access-reject
access regulation
anti-monopoly law
