摘要
运用委托代理理论,通过第三方物流中物流服务外包方与物流服务提供商之间委托代理关系的讨论,分析了非对称信息下第三方物流的最优激励选择问题。通过第三方物流最优激励拓展分析,进一步探讨了第三方物流最优激励合同的影响因素,提出了建立物流服务提供商最优激励的政策建议。
Through the theory of principal-agent, this paper discusses the principal-agent relationship between the contractors and providers of the third party logistics. Based on asymmetric information the paper analyses the optimal incentives problem of the third party logistics. Through the extensive analysis of the optimal incentives of the third party logistics, this paper discusses their impact factors and proposes a policy construction suggestion for the optimal incentives through logistics service providers.
出处
《工业工程》
2006年第3期19-22,27,共5页
Industrial Engineering Journal
关键词
不对称信息
第三方物流
委托-代理关系
最优激励
asymmetric information
third party logistics
principal-agent
optimal incentives
