摘要
经济波动大、周期短、调控频繁是我国经济发展的特征之一,行政手段一直在我国发挥着重要的调控作用。本文指出,这种情况与我国商业银行没有充分发挥筛选功能密切相关。长期利益导向的商业银行具有筛选功能,能够发挥对经济的自调节功能。而在规模导向或短期利益导向的商业银行体系中,商业银行具有更为强烈的顺周期倾向,对市场信号反映不灵敏,不能有效发挥筛选功能,商业银行信贷行为本身就是经济波动的原因之一。因而,要提高我国市场调控效率,减小经济波动,尤其需要深化银行体制改革、充分发挥商业银行的筛选功能和自调节功能。
This paper points out that administrative control has long been playing an important role in macroeconomic management in China, this situation is quite attributable to the incomplete performance of the screening function by the domestic commercial banks. The long-term-profit-oriented commercial banks have a screening function that results in a self-regulation of the economy. However, in a system seeking after large scale and short-term profit, commercial banks are much more inclined to a pro-cycle. They are not sensitive to the signals from the market, thereby failing to give full play to their screening function. The credit behavior of commercial banks is intrinsically one of the factors that cause the fluctuation of the economy. Accordingly, in order to improve the regulation of the Chinese market and diminish the fluctuation of the economy, it will be of great necessity to deepen banking system reform and give full play to the screening and self-regulating functions of commercial banks.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第4期82-89,共8页
Journal of Financial Research
关键词
宏观调控
商业银行
筛选功能
macroeconomic management
commercial banks
screening function
