摘要
比较分析了共同代理和独家代理两种代理模式的激励效率.通过两个委托人面对同一个代理人的多任务代理模型分析与两个委托人分别面对自己的代理人的代理模型分析,研究任务相关性对共同代理与独家代理选择的影响.通过代理人对不同任务的努力程度、委托人收益和激励效率等问题的深入研究,得到的主要结论为:相对容易完成的任务激励效率较高;而相对难以完成的任务之委托人更偏向于选择共同代理;相对容易完成的任务之委托人,其对代理模式的选择取决于两个任务的互补程度.并将基本结论应用于研究型高校薪酬制度改革实践中.
The purpose of this paper is to compare the incentive efficiency of common agency and exclusive dealing, and to examine the influence of the correlations of two tasks on the choice of the two typical agency modes. By establishing a model with two principals and one agent, this paper solved the agents＇ efforts to different tasks, and calculated the principals＇ residuals under common agency and exclusive dealings. The main findings of this paper show that the incentive of the easier task is more efficient, and the principal whose task is easier is more inclined to ＂common agency＂, but the inclination of the other principal is decided by the compliment degree of the two tasks. These findings were aoolied to the compensation system of the faculty in Research-oriented University.
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第1期47-53,共7页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
教育部人文社会科学"十五"规划研究课题(01JC630003)
关键词
独家代理
共同代理
多任务代理
exclusive dealing
common agency
muhitask agency
