摘要
无论是对于传统经济学还是现代博弈论,决策者完全理性这一基本假设前提正在经受因实证经济学发展而带来的巨大挑战。在传统博弈框架中引入描述投资者风险态度变量使得问题更加接近实际,并以一个简单的单阶段静态博弈为例说明了风险偏好状态依存特性对于证券市场博弈结构的影响。
As a basic assumption to either traditional economics or modem game theory, perfect rationality, is now encountering a huge challenge, attributing to the development of empirical economics. Introducing a variable curving the investor＇ s risk attitude can make the problem more realistically. We give an example of a single stage game between the institution and the investors in the stocks market, in order to analyze the impact of variable risk attitude.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第11期93-99,共7页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金资助(基金编号70372011)。
关键词
风险态度
效用
行为博弈论
risk attitude, utility, behavioral game theory.
