摘要
运用实验方法构建具有不同信息结构的市场环境,研究风险偏好与外部监管环境对盈余操纵行为的影响。实验结果表明,外部监管环境对盈余操纵行为具有显著约束作用;信息不对称时,信息成本将加重操纵程度,内幕交易者借助信息优势,或者回避风险,或者获取超额收益;非内幕交易者存在过度自信表现;信息结构不影响风险偏好者的操纵意愿。但与外部惩戒力共同影响其最终收益。
the impact of risk preference and external supervising on earnings manipulation behavior.The results indicate that external supervising has a restriction effect on earnings manipulation behavior remarkably:external supervising coefficient,the combination of punishment co- efficient and spot test probability,has an integrative effect,which is higher than the effect respectively;Under the conditions of infor- mation asymmetry,information obtained by the insiders can be diffused through the market.Relied on information superiority,the insid- ers can avoid risks and acquire surplus earnings;Non-insiders have overconfident performance;Information structures don't affect manip- ulation wills of the person with the risk preference,but have a conjunct influence on the ultimate earnings with the external supervising.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第5期58-65,共8页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(项目号:70302008)
霍英东教育基金会高等院校青年教师基金(基金号:101084)资助
