摘要
文章采用多元回归的方法研究派现与上市公司三种不同代理成本之间的关系。实证发现,派现能降低股东与管理者的代理成本;派现与国有股、法人股比例成二次非线性关系;正常现金股利发放只是大股东获取公共收益的一种手段,不能缓解大小股东之间的利益冲突,降低大股东的私有收益。
This paper investigates the relationship between cash dividend and three different agency problems by multianalysis. We find cash dividend can debase the agency cost between shareholders and manager. Cash dividend is quadratic non-linear relationship to stateshare＇s proportion and corporate-share＇proportion. Natural cash dividend policy is just approach to gain public income by larger shareholder, but not to reduce the private benefit of larger shareholder. Natural cash dividend policy also doesn＇t mitigate the conflict in two kinds of shareholders.
出处
《华东经济管理》
2005年第11期64-68,共5页
East China Economic Management
