基于代理成本理论的股利政策分析

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摘要 20世纪70年代,Jenson和Meck-ling首先将代理成本理论引入到公司理财领域,他们将现代企业的代理关系定义为一种契约关系,即委托人雇用代理人并授予代理人某些决策权。

作者霍晓利

机构地区山东水利职业学院

出处《齐鲁珠坛》 2008年第2期15-18,共4页

关键词上市公司公司股利政策代理成本理论代理问题管理者代理人市场机制股票股利委托人控股股东

参考文献5

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齐鲁珠坛

2008年第2期

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