摘要
在公共产品供求关系中,有合作中的效率,也有不合作的效率漏出。供求主体中的一方在决定采取什么行动时,必然考虑其他方对这种行动会做出什么样的反应。从根本上讲,公共产品的提供是不同利益主体对一部分社会资源配置的策略选择。因此,博弈问题就产生了。根据博弈对象的内生性原理,探讨我国农村公共产品的生产和供给(由谁提供、提供多少、怎样提供等),实际上是一个寻求中央政府、地方政府和农民之间的博弈的过程。博弈事实上成为影响中国公共财政政策的一个重要因素。本文就是在分析中央政府、地方政府和农民之间的博弈关系的基础上,从理论视角提出一些减少不合作的对策。
There are cooperate efficiency and efficiency leakage because of disoperation in demands and supplies of public goods. One of the managements of supply or demand decides to take action according to others reactions. Radically, It is a tactic choice for different profit parts to collocate social resources in supplies of public goods. So game appears. Basing on endogenesis principle of game objects, Discussing on demands and supplies of rural public goods actually is a course of seeking for games within central government ,local government and farmer. Game has become an important factor impacting on public financial policy of China. The essay will put forth some countermeasures to reduce disoperation from theoretic angle after analyzing on games within central government ,local government and farmer.
出处
《北京电子科技学院学报》
2004年第3期17-20,共4页
Journal of Beijing Electronic Science And Technology Institute
