摘要
本文根据我国过渡性资本外逃的现实,构建一个政府和国内企业之间关于外资超国民待遇和资本投向的博弈模型,从理论上演绎了外资超国民待遇导致过渡性资本外逃的机制;揭示了资本管制程度对于过渡性资本外逃的效应;诠释了我国改革开放初期为何能够实施程度较高的内外资差别待遇,而在国内资本存量越来越大的今天,政府降低外资超国民待遇的客观必然性。文章进一步分析了当政府不了解企业资本外逃真实成本时,不对称信息对最优外资税率的效应。最后文章认为。
According to the reality of the intermediate capital flight which occurs in China recent years, this paper established a model between the government and the domestically-funded enterprises on the foundation of the discrimination treatment to the foreign-funded and the domestically-funded enterprises. We analyzed how the discrimination treatment caused the intermediate capital flight; how the capital control influenced the intermediate capital flight; why the government gave the foreign-funded enterprises vast special treatments in initial periods of China's reform and open policy. The paper also pointed out that considering the domestic investment quantity is increasing, the government should reduce the discriminate of the taxations rate. Furthermore, We analyzed how the asymmetry information, which means the government didn't know the enterprise's cost of intermediate capital flight, influenced the optimal taxations discrimination. Finally, the paper concluded that the unification of the taxations rate of domestically-funded and foreign-funded enterprises in China was the direction of the reform.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第4期108-115,共8页
Economic Research Journal
