摘要
本文讨论公司治理的参与人包括股东和经理情况下,经理分享利润和不分享利润情况下对经理工作努力水平和报酬水平的影响。用股东和经理的收益函数代替效用函数,选用满足单调似然特征和凸性条件的产出概率分布函数,把股东和经理行为模型化为可求解的委托-代理模型。对模型求解发现,在经理分享利润情况下,如果经理努力边际负效用高会导致较高的经理的激励工资,当经理分享利润比例较高和激励工资增幅较大时,能够激励经理更加努力工作。
This paper intends to discuss the influnences on manager's efforts and payment level under the conditions of their sharing and not sharing profit when the corporation only includes the share holder and the manager. We set up a solvable principal-agent model by using validity function rather than revenue function and choosing the output probability distribution function which has the characteristics of MLRP and CDFC, The solution of model shows that higher disutility of the manager's effort will result in higher incentive wage;and more profit and higher incentive wage will lead to the manager's working harder.
出处
《北京科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2004年第2期29-33,共5页
Journal of University of Science and Technology Beijing(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
委托-代理模型
利润分享
经理行为
一阶条件方法
The principal-agent model
the sharing of prof it
manager behavior
the first-order approach
