摘要
采用博弈论的方法对上市公司资信监控进行了分析。根据模型的不同假设前提,构造了单阶段和多阶段的博弈模型,得出博弈双方的均衡战略,以及某些关键因素(如评估机构对上市公司的惩罚系数及监督成本,上市公司的资信欺骗额等)对博弈双方的影响,提出了减少上市公司资信欺骗发生的建议。
The listed firms credit monitoring is analyzed by using the game theory. The models of one-stage game and multistage games are established based on the different hypotheses. And the equilibrium strategy is deduced. It dicusses the key factors' impaction on the two parties including the mulct coefficient that the evaluation institution punishes listed firms, monitoring cost and cheat amount. It puts forword suggestions to reduce listed firms' information cheating.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2004年第16期133-135,共3页
Commercial Research
