摘要
伴随中国资本市场快速发展 ,资本市场投资主体的违规投资行为普遍存在 ,这是监管者与投资者博弈的结果。通过纯策略博弈均衡分析和混合策略的最优行为选择分析可以看出 :投资者违规与否取决于违规行为与合规行为的比较效用大小 ;在效用最大化准则下 ,监管达到相对满意的均衡状态是可能的 ,但最理想的均衡状态不可能实现。
Basing on the illegal investment behaviors of the investors in China's current capital market, the author derives his basic views from the analysis using pure strategy game equilibrium theory and the optimization of mixed strategy, and puts forward the effective selection strategy of how to set up the supervision laws and regulations on the investment behaviors, which is valuable to China's nowadays capital market.
