摘要
同城快递的发展使得下游代理商采用以便捷运输代替库存的方式来减少订货量,这使上游服务集成商的订货预测失真并导致缺货,形成现实中的"逆向牛鞭效应"。为解决这个问题,本文以一个两阶段的备件服务供应链系统为背景,引入惩罚系数α和激励系数β,并考虑备件生命周期末期带来的价值损失,研究了引入奖惩机制前后的订货决策问题。研究结论采用企业的相关数据进行仿真分析,证明了引入惩罚奖励机制将有效地缓解"逆向牛鞭效应"并优化其相关收益。
The development of city express can make the downstream agent reduce the order quantity by the convenient transportation in-stead of stock which may cause order prediction of the upstream service integrators distorted even out of stock. In the reality, the reverse bullwhip effect arises. In this paper, considering a two stage spare parts service supply chain, we introduce the penalty and incentive co-efficient and study the ordering issue by factoring value loss at the end of life cycle. At last, the paper presents a simulation of ordering decision considering penalty and incentive mechanism with some enterprise＇ s related data, which proves that penalty and incentive mechanism will effectively ease the ＂reverse bullwhip effect＂ and optimize its relevant profits.
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期159-166,共8页
Management Review
关键词
便捷运输
价值损失
逆向牛鞭效应
惩罚
激励
convenient transportation, value loss, reverse bullwhip effect, penalty, incentive
