摘要
休谟认为同情是人性中强有力的原则 ,同情在表现形式上是自然的 ,而同情感的实际内容是人为的。同情是道德区别和道德判断的心理机制 ,是沟通他的心理学和伦理学的桥梁。但由于同情原则建立在抽象人性论的基础上 ,休谟调和个体情感的特殊性与道德原则的普遍性的努力不可能成功。
In Hume's views, Sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature. The form of sympathy is natural. The sympathy sense revised by imagination is artificial. It is mechanism of sympathy that distinguish virtue and vice and make judgment. He completed transition from psychology to ethics by virtue of sympathy. Hume didn't succeed in conciliating the particularity of individual sensation and universality of moral principle because of his theory based on abstract human nature.
出处
《伦理学研究》
2004年第4期97-101,共5页
Studies in Ethics
关键词
休谟
同情
心理机制
Hume sympathy psychological mechanism
