摘要
本文研究风险中性供应商和风险厌恶零售商组成的二级供应链协调问题。运用利润-CVaR度量零售商风险厌恶,建立随机需求下供应链价格补贴协调模型。在一定范围内,最优订购量随风险厌恶因子和CVaR权重的增加而减少,价格补贴随CVaR权重和风险厌恶因子的增加而增加,价格补贴契约能完美协调供应链并通过数值算例进行验证。
This paper studied the coordination of a two-echelon supply chain with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. The risk aversion of the retailer was measured by profit-CVaR. We construct the markdown money contract coordination model of supply chain under stochastic demand. At a certain range, the optimal ordering quantity is reduced along with the increase of risk aversion factor and weight of CVaR;and markdown money is increased with the increase of risk aversion factor and weight of CVaR. Markdown money contract can perfectly coordinate supply chain. And we verify the conclusions through a numerical example.
出处
《管理科学与工程》
2016年第2期76-84,共9页
Management Science and Engineering
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(13YJA630055)
长沙理工大学公路工程省部共建教育部重点实验室开放基金资金项目(kfj120104)
湖南省现代企业管理研究中心开放基金(13QGB1)。
