摘要
研究知名企业推出新产品时价格补贴契约对三阶层供应链的协调问题。首先针对供应链系统的全局协调,设计了契约参数需要满足的必要条件;在此基础上,对契约参数的进一步约束解决了分散式供应链的双边际化效应;最后通过数值实验得出如下结论:三阶层供应链的价格补贴契约下,供应链的全局协调取决于系统的成本结构;上游企业提供给下游企业的价格补贴与批发价格成正比;对契约参数的约束可以实现个体决策目标同系统整体目标达成一致,但不会影响供应链的总利润;在高风险市场,供应商是实施该契约模型的积极倡导者。
This paper deals with a markdown money contract with a three-stage SC for a well-known enterprise facing a new product. Firstly, we design the contract parameters which can assure the system efficiency to be achieved ; Then, the ＂Double Marginalization＂ is solved by turning the contract parameters; lastly, we can conclude that ： achieving the system efficiency depend on the cost structure of the system ; the markdown money is in direct rate to the whole-sale price; turning the contract parameters can accomplish the system efficiency as well as improve the profits of all the SC actors and cannot influence the total profit of the SC; under the high risks, the supplier will become the active initiator to covenant the markdown money contract.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第4期25-30,共6页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(90510010)
关键词
供应链
契约
价格补贴
Supply Chain
Contract
Markdown Money
