摘要
共同基金的权力滥用与利益冲突源自投资公司独特的管理架构。由于投资顾问独立于其所管理的基金并对其所管理的基金拥有管理权,投资顾问的利益与基金股东的利益相互冲突。过去几十年基金业的繁荣景象,使那些负责对基金进行监管的人员或机构,如法院和SEC,低估了共同基金特殊的管理架构所产生的权力滥用的危险。
In US Mutual Funds, non-executive directors play a keyrole in preventing conflict of interest and ensuringinvestor interest. The American practice of corporategovernance provides positive experience for theirChinese counterparts. Strengthening supervision of fundmanagers and ensuring that rules in place to safeguardinterest of investors should be taken as one of thepriorities.
出处
《证券市场导报》
北大核心
2004年第7期4-10,共7页
Securities Market Herald
