保持金融稳定防范道德风险被引量：101

Financial Stability and Moral Hazard Reduction

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摘要本文从金融稳定与道德风险的关联性出发,探讨在保持金融稳定的同时防范道德风险的理论与实践道路。文章的基本结论如下:第一,金融稳定与道德风险具备互作用关联性,由于系统性银行体系或支付体系的不稳定所造成的经济与社会成本是灾难性的,因此需要金融安全网,但是金融安全网设计与运行的偏差将导致金融机构道德风险倾向更高,从而进一步降低金融稳定,因此在机制设计上如何寻求高度金融稳定与低道德风险的平衡是世界性的政策挑战;第二,良好的破产机制是保持金融稳定、防范道德风险的突破口,但是体制与机制的不健全约束了破产机制实施;第三,金融机构破产面临行政性关闭、立法、司法、清算受偿顺序、时机、补偿和保护性监管等多个技术问题;第四,随着配套体制的完善,优胜劣汰将成为一种激励金融机构行为优化的信号。 This paper analyzes the relationship between financial stability and moral hazard. Conclusions are as follows. First,financial stability and moral hazard show a interactive correlation, since the explicit or implicit financial safety net may encourage moral hazard tendency which in turn reduces the financial stability. Second, a sound bankruptcy rule for financial institutions is a necessary condition for financial stability and moral hazard reduction, however, the lack of institutional arrangement and operational procedure restricts the bankruptcy enforcement. Third, financial institutions' bankruptcy faces difficulties with many technical issues,such as administrative closedown,accelerating legislation, law enforcement, liquidation procedure, timing, compensation and protective supervision. Finally, accompanied by improvement of related institutional arrangements,a sound competition with bankruptcy threat will be a signaling incentive for improving financial institutions' behavior.

作者周小川

机构地区中国人民银行

出处《金融研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第4期1-7,共7页 Journal of Financial Research

关键词金融稳定道德风险破产信号机制 financial stability,moral hazard,liquidation,signaling

分类号 F830 [经济管理—金融学]

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