摘要
所有权与经营权分离产生的道德风险问题是公司治理的核心内容之一,可变薪酬方案是解决公司治理的重要方法。利用Merton跳-扩散期权定价模型构建了经营者股票期权收入与公司业绩之间的关系,分析了宏观经济因素,经理行为和机构投资者行为对股票价格跳跃过程的影响,指出了经理行为以及机构投资者对经理行为的回应是引起股票价格跳跃过程的主要动力源,提出了采用经理股票期权作为可变薪酬机制能激发经理努力工作,提高公司业绩,增加个人收入,降低代理成本,减少道德风险。
The moral risk, brought forth by the separation of ownership and control, is one of the core problems of corporation governance, while the adjustable compensation scheme is one of the major countermeasures to control it. The Merton's option pricing model of jump-diffusion process is applied to set up the correlation between executives' option earnings and firm performance. Studies are also made for the effect on stock price process by macroeconomic factors, executives' behavior and organized investors' behavior, among which the later two are primary impetuses. Finally the paper suggests that an option incentive plan as one of the adjustable compensation schemes will stimulate executives to work hard, raise firm performance, increase executives' earnings, reduce agency cost, and alleviate the moral risk.
出处
《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》
CAS
2004年第1期113-115,共3页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering
基金
湖南省基础研究科研资助项目(oljzyz007)
关键词
期权激励
公司治理
经理行为
公司业绩
option incentive
corporation governance
executives' behavior
firm performance
