摘要
运用经济学的制度理论、博弈理论透视、分析我国行政救济制度变迁的诱因、特征和合理对策,结论认为我国行政救济制度的变迁是一种A+B模式替代A模式的卡尔多—希克斯改进,要实现B模式的最终实现应该选择司法独立的途径。
The theory of institutional economics and the theory of game are applied to analysing the inducive causes,the characteristics and the policy implications of the institutional changes in the administrative relief system in China. The paper concludes that all the changes have presented a substitution of A model for A+B model which have brought out a Kaldor Hicks improvement. The paper also points out that,to carry out the B model,it would be necessary to have the judicial independence as the prerequisite
出处
《福建行政学院福建经济管理干部学院学报》
2003年第4期7-11,共5页
Journal of Fujian School of Administration and Fujian Institute of Economics and Management
