摘要
本文从参与企业债务重组各方之间的关系与信息结构角度出发 ,分析了完全信息和不完全信息下的企业与债权人之间的债务重组博弈 ,得出债务重组无效率的根源在于信息不对称问题 ,并在此基础上分析了中国企业债务重组的博弈过程 ,指出中国企业债务重组的最大障碍在于 :“内部人”控制所导致的企业经理与国家之间的严重信息不对称。
This paper investigate the game of corporate debt restructuring between company and its creditor, it educe that symmetric information is the great obstacle of debt restructuring. In the debt restructuring of Chinese SOEs, insider control is very serious, it incur more inefficient continuance, enhance the dominant role of commercial bank and investment bank, revise the bankruptcy law and improve shareholder structure will be helpful to overcome this inefficiency.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第10期89-96,共8页
China Industrial Economics
