摘要
基于Stackelberg主从对策模型,运用不完全信息动态博弈建立了双渠道供应链决策模型,得到了贝叶斯均衡的决策价格和利润。对模型中各关键参数进行敏感性分析,研究发现市场风险和零售商对需求的预测精度对零售商的信息共享选择有重要影响,市场风险和预测精度越小,零售商越不愿意信息共享;反之市场风险和预测精度较大时,零售商有信息共享的动机。最后进一步得出了制造商的议价能力与零售商信息共享选择的关系。
Based on the Stackelberg master-slave game theory and by using dynamic game with incomplete information, a decision model for a supply chain with dual-channel is established. With the model, the bayesian equilibrium of price and profit is obtained. By sensitivity analysis for key parameters, it is found that the market risk and demand prediction accuracy of retailers have a significant influence on the retailers＇ decision for information sharing. The study shows that, the higher the market risk and prediction accuracy are, the more a retailer is willing to share information with others. Also, the obtained results re- veal the relationship between manufacturer＇s bargaining power and retailer＇s information sharing choice.
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2013年第5期21-25,共5页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71003070)
上海教委重点学科建设资助项目(J50504)
上海教委重点课程建设资助项目(产业经济学)
上海理工大学校内人文社科基地培育资助项目(XSJ02)
2013-2014年上海市大文科研究生学术新人培育计划
关键词
双渠道
信息共享
议价能力
预测精度
市场风险
dual-channel
information sharing
bargaining power
prediction accuracy
market risk
