摘要
我国一级市场新股初始报酬率过高 ,IPO定价市场化程度低 ,一级市场投机现象严重 ,这恰是目前无“绿鞋”期权的情况下 ,承销商与一级市场投机者之间博弈的纳什均衡产生的结果。引入“绿鞋”期权后 ,承销商与投机者之间形成完全信息动态博弈 ,使承销商提高设定的发行价格 ,投机者减少投机 ,从而可以缓解一级市场存在的上述问题。
The primary stock market in China is characterized by excessively high initial rate of return for new stocks, low degree of marketization in the pricing of initial public offerings and heavy speculation. This is exactly the Nash equilibrium result of the perfect-information dynamic games between underwriters and speculators without 'green shoe' options. After the introduction of 'green shoe' options the perfect-information dynamic games between underwriters and speculators would enable the underwriters to set higher offering price and cut back on speculation, thus relieving the above problems in the primary market.
出处
《贵州财经学院学报》
2003年第4期25-27,共3页
Journal of Guizhou College of Finance and Economics
