摘要
国有企业委托代理关系中的寻租活动加大了代理成本 ,浪费着国企资源 ,成为推行现代企业制度的梗阻。寻租活动不但泯灭人的良知 ,而且坑害政府官员 ,成为腐败的温床。如果建立一种机制 ,使得寻租的边际成本远远大于寻租的边际收益 。
The look-for rent activities in agents commissioned by state owned enterprises increase the cost of commission, waste resource of state owned enterprise, and become a obstacle for carrying out the modern enterprise regulation. The look-for rent activities do not only harm conscience but also trap government official, and turns to be the seedbed for corruption. If a system can be established to make the marginal cost of look-for rent greatly overpass the marginal income, it will help the state owned enterprises step into a healthy development.
出处
《大连教育学院学报》
2001年第1期77-78,共2页
Journal of Dalian Education University
关键词
委托代理关系
寻租活动
边际成本
agent commission
look-for rent activity
marginal cost
