摘要
在敌意收购中 ,目标公司的董事无疑是最大的利益受损者 ,因为敌意收购一旦成功 ,他们很有可能丧失工作或名誉扫地。因而 ,目标公司董事往往会运用手中掌握的经营公司的权力 ,采取各种措施挫败敌意收购者。对于这种反收购行为 ,美国判例法援用原有的商业判断规则 ,并在其基础上发展出了一系列测试标准 ,用以评判目标公司董事的反收购行为是否符合董事的注意义务 ,主要有 :主要目的测试标准、相当性测试标准、最大价值测试标准、公正拍卖者测试标准等。
A hostile takeover has great impact on the directors of the target company because the directors will probably lose their job or reputation once the takeover is consummated. Thus, these directors often take advantage of their authority and try every defensive tactic to defeat the takeover. In order to test whether the directors violate Duty of Care by taking those anti-takeover activities, U.S. common law applies the traditional Business Judgment Rule and develops a series of principles on its basis, which include Primary Purpose Test, Proportionality Test, Value Maximization Test, Fair Auctioneer Test, etc.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2003年第4期144-147,共4页
Commercial Research
