摘要
粮食安全是国家安全的基础,耕地“非粮化”整改是维护粮食安全的重要方式,但部分基层政府在执行国家耕地“非粮化”整改政策中出现了观望式治理的偏差现象。基层政府耕地“非粮化”观望式治理的形成受主体复杂性和制度复杂性双重影响,其主体复杂性表现为基层政府的内在偏好不一致,主要存有积极作为、平稳避责和消极躺平三种类型,上述偏好直接影响着基层政府执行上级政策的行为选择。而制度复杂性包含着考核目标设置冲突、内容体系设计繁杂和制度执行环境复杂三重逻辑,这些要素基于内在偏好间接调适着基层政府的观望式治理行为——持积极作为型偏好者主要由绩效考核目标冲突和保障制度配套缺失所致,持平稳避责型偏好者主要由制度内容体系丰富易混淆、制度调整周期短且内容有差异和处罚措施执行不到位所致,持消极躺平型偏好者则主要由干部选拔任用不力所致。规制基层政府耕地“非粮化”观望式治理行为应坚持分类施策原则,构建系统化绩效考核体系,推进“谁来种地”配套制度建设,加强耕地“非粮化”整改政策学习研讨,提升耕地“非粮化”整改政策稳定性,强化耕地“非粮化”整改处罚力度和优化耕地“非粮化”整改中的用人制度。
Food security is the foundation of national security,and the rectification of cultivated land“non-grainization”is an important way to maintain food security.However,some grassroots governments have shown deviations in wait-and-see governance when implementing the national policy on rectification of cultivated land“non-grainization”.The formation of grassroots government’s wait-and-see governance of“non-grainization”of cultivated land is influenced by both subject complexity and institutional complexity.The subject complexity is manifested in the inconsistent internal preferences of grassroots governments,which mainly include three types of preferences:active action,stable avoidance of responsibility,and passive lying down.These preferences directly affect the behavioral choices of grassroots governments in implementing superior policies.Institutional complexity includes the triple logic of conflicting assessment target settings,complicated content system design,and complex institutional implementation environment.These factors indirectly adjust grassroots government behavior based on internal preferences.In addition,the wait-and-see governance of grassroots governments with active action preferences is mainly caused by conflicts in performance assessment targets and lack of supporting guarantee systems.The wait-and-see governance of grassroots governments with stable avoidance of responsibility preferences is mainly caused by the rich institutional content system that is easy to confuse,the relatively short and different institutional adjustment cycles,and the inadequate implementation of punishment measures.The wait-and-see governance of grassroots governments with passive lying down preferences is mainly caused by poor selection and appointment of cadres.To regulate the wait-and-see governance behavior of the grassroots government on the“non-grainization”of cultivated land,we should adhere to the principle of classified policy implementation,build a systematic regional development performance evaluation system,promote the construction of supporting systems for“who will farm the land”,organize study and discussion on the rectification policy of the“non-grainization”of cultivated land,improve the stability of the rectification policy of the“non-grainization”of cultivated land,strengthen the punishment of the rectification of the“non-grainization”of cultivated land,and optimize the employment system in the rectification of the“non-grainization”of cultivated land.
作者
何阳
HE Yang(School of Government,Yunnan University,Kunming 650500,China)
出处
《贵州师范大学学报(社会科学版)》
2026年第1期72-83,共12页
Journal of Guizhou Normal University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
云南省哲学社会科学基金青年项目“云南基层政府耕地‘非粮化’治理的政策偏差及因应策略研究”(QN202430)的阶段性成果。
关键词
耕地“非粮化”
基层政府行为
观望式治理
主体复杂性
制度复杂性
粮食安全
“non-grainization”of cultivated land
grassroots government behavior
wait-and-see governance
subject complexity
institutional complexity
food security
