摘要
为推动煤炭企业实现双碳目标及低碳转型,基于竞争优势理论构建煤炭企业A、煤炭企业B两方演化博弈模型,建立收益矩阵,利用复制动态方程原理和雅可比矩阵对模型进行分析,研究煤炭企业绿色低碳转型策略及博弈模型的稳定条件,运用Matlab进行仿真分析,研究低碳技术创新成本、成本系数、市场份额、政府补贴系数以及惩罚力度等参数变化对煤炭企业绿色低碳转型策略选择的影响。结果表明:在市场自由竞争下,具有规模差异的煤炭企业博弈存在理想策略组合,该组合的形成受内外部动力影响较大;低碳技术创新成本及成本系数降低、市场份额增加时,以及补贴系数和政府惩罚力度增加时,煤炭企业会更倾向于选择“绿色低碳发展”策略;内外部动力的组合激励效果优于单一动力,能够更有效地推动煤炭企业的低碳转型。研究结果可以强化企业内生动力,优化外部政策组合,增强“激励-约束”双向驱动,推动内外部动力协同,以便更好地推动煤炭企业的绿色可持续发展。
In order to promote coal enterprises to achieve the dual-carbon goal and low-carbon transformation,a two-party evolutionary game model of coal enterprise A and coal enterprise B is constructed,based on the theory of competitive advantage,and a revenue matrix is established.Based on the principle of replicated dynamic equations and Jacobi matrix to analyze the model,the green and low-carbon transformation strategy of coal enterprises and the stability conditions of the game model are explored,and use Matlab to analyze the cost of low-carbon technology innovation,cost coefficient,market share,government subsidy coefficient and penalty strength and other parameter changes on the choice of green and low-carbon transformation strategies of coal enterprises.The results show that under the free competition in the market,there is an ideal strategy combination in the game of coal enterprises with scale difference,the formation of which is greatly influenced by internal and external dynamics;when the cost of low-carbon technology innovation and cost coefficient are reduced,the market share is increased,and the subsidy coefficient and the punishment strength of the government are increased,the coal enterprises are more inclined to choose the strategy of“green low-carbon development”;the combined incentive effect of internal and external driving forces is superior to that of a single driving force and can more effectively promote the low-carbon transformation of coal enterprises.The results can better promote the green and sustainable development of coal enterprises by strengthening the endogenous motivation of enterprises,optimizing the combination of external policies,enhancing the two-way drive of“incentives and constraints”,and increasing the synergy of internal and external motivation.
作者
王喜莲
赵悦彤
贾县民
张嘉茹
杨晴
SANA Wakeel
WANG Xilian;ZHAO Yuetong;JIA Xianmin;ZHANG Jiaru;YANG Qing;SANA Wakeel(College of Management,Xi’an University of Science and Technology,Xi’an 710054,China;Research Center for Energy Economy and Management,Xi’an University of Science and Technology,Xi’an 710054,China;College of Management,Xi’an University of Finance and Economics,Xi’an 710100,China;School of Digital Economics,Hebi Polytechnic,Hebi 458030,China)
出处
《西安科技大学学报》
北大核心
2026年第1期47-57,共11页
Journal of Xi’an University of Science and Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72004181)
陕西省社会科学基金项目(2022D063)。
关键词
双碳目标
煤炭企业
绿色低碳转型
演化博弈模型
内外部动力
dual carbon goals
coal enterprises
green and low-carbon transformation
evolutionary game models
internal and external dynamics
