摘要
以2014—2023年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本数据,探究无薪独董的任职动机和履职表现。研究发现,无薪独董在公司治理中往往会通过规避风险来寻求个人声誉利益,致使公司绩效不佳。由此产生新的代理问题,即缺乏薪酬激励的无薪独董倾向保守,甚至为获取声誉而牺牲公司利益。这种激励的错位表明无薪独董会产生一种新的代理成本,而并非公司的免费午餐。因此,应当重视无薪独董与公司之间全新的代理问题,尊重无薪独董的经济人属性,给予无薪独董合理的薪酬激励,从而避免无薪独董为谋求声誉利益最大化而罔顾公司及股东的利益。
This paper uses sample data from Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghaiand Shenzhen from 2014 to 2023 to explore the motivation and performance of unpaid independent directors.The results show that unpaid independent directors often seek personal reputation benefits by avoiding risks in corporate governance,resulting in poor company performance.This creates a new agency problem,where unpaid independent directors who lack compensation incentives tend to be conservative and even sacrifice company interests for reputation.This misalignment of incentives indicates that unpaid independent directors generate a new agency cost,rather than the company's free lunch.Therefore,it is important to pay attention to the new agency problem between unpaid independent directors and the company,respect the economic attributes of unpaid independent directors,provide reasonable salary incentives to them,and avoid unpaid independent directors ignoring the interests of the company and shareholders to maximize their reputation and benefits.
作者
朱羿锟
郭永超
ZHU Yi-kun;GUO Yong-chao(Law School/Intellectual Property School,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632)
出处
《软科学》
北大核心
2025年第11期137-144,共8页
Soft Science
基金
国家重点研发计划项目(2022YFC3303200)。
关键词
无薪独董
个人声誉
代理成本
薪酬激励
公司治理
unpaid independent director
personal reputation
agency costs
salary incentives
corporate governance
