摘要
为分析政企合作监管背景下危险品运输主要参与者行为对危险品运输安全监管效果的影响,构建了危险品运输企业、地方政府和危险品委托企业的三方演化博弈模型,分析了三者在危险品运输监管中的互动行为和策略选择。通过演化分析和数值仿真分析探讨了不同参数条件下三方策略的演化稳定策略,并讨论了初始化状态、委托企业额外奖励、合法与非法运输成本及监管成本对博弈结果的影响。结果表明,通过政企合作监管新创立的运输企业、激励企业技术创新、实施差异化监管策略以及提供政策支持和激励,可以有效提升危险品运输的安全性和合规性,对于提高危险品运输监管效率和保障运输安全具有理论和实践价值。
To examine the impact of the behaviors of key participants in hazardous materials transportation on the effectiveness of safety regulation within the framework of government-enterprise cooperative supervision,a three-party evolutionary game model was developed.This model involves hazardous materials transportation companies,local governments,and hazardous materials consignor enterprises.The interactive behaviors and strategic choices of these three parties in hazardous materials transportation regulation were analyzed.Using evolutionary analysis and numerical simulations,the study explored the evolutionarily stable strategies of the three parties under different parameter conditions.Additionally,it examined the effects of initial states,additional rewards from consignor enterprises,legal and illegal transportation costs,and regulatory costs on the game outcomes.The initialization state establishes the baseline conditions for the game,influencing the initial strategic interactions and potentially shaping the long-term equilibrium.Additional rewards serve as incentives for consignor enterprises to comply with regulations and adopt safer transportation practices,thereby influencing their decision-making towards greater adherence to safety standards.The costs of legal and illegal transportation play a crucial role in shaping the strategic choices of transportation enterprises,influencing their likelihood of engaging in rule-breaking behavior and impacting the overall safety of the industry.Supervision costs,incurred by local governments,represent the resources allocated to overseeing transportation safety.The model evaluates how these costs can be optimally distributed to ensure effective regulation and oversight.Evolutionary analysis uncovers the stability of strategies over time,identifying the conditions that lead to the dominance of specific strategies.Meanwhile,numerical simulations predict the outcomes of the game under various parameter settings,illustrating how changes in parameters can alter strategic interactions and influence the overall dynamics of the system.The results indicate that the establishment of new transportation enterprises through government-enterprise cooperative regulation,along with incentives for technological innovation,differentiated regulatory strategies,and policy support,can significantly improve the safety and compliance of hazardous materials transportation.These findings offer both theoretical and practical insights,contributing to the enhancement of hazardous materials transportation regulation efficiency and the assurance of transportation safety.
作者
邓帅
曹执令
胡鸿
DENG Shuai;CAO Zhiling;HU Hong(School of Safety and Management Engineering,Hunan Institute of Technology,Hengyang 421002,Hunan,China)
出处
《安全与环境学报》
北大核心
2025年第11期4320-4331,共12页
Journal of Safety and Environment
基金
湖南省教育厅重点项目(23A0627)
湖南省自然科学基金项目(2023JJ50118)
安全科学与工程湖南省“十四五”应用特色学科(湘教通[2022]337号)
智慧安全湖南省现代产业学院(湘教通[2023]317号)
湖南省水利科技项目(XSKJ2023059-47)。
关键词
安全社会工程
危险品运输
演化博弈
安全监管
safety social engineering
hazardous materials transportation
evolutionary game
safety supervision
