摘要
在人工智能无所不能的预言和“德雷福斯之问”巨大的张力中间,派生出许多关于数字智能技术富有争议的哲学议题。数智技术以大数据、智能算法和算力为基础,创造出形态新颖的数智机器(人)。人类认知个体与数智机器交互需求大增。其中,利用数智技术将已故亲人“复活”成虚拟数字人,催生出“数字人是数字生命”的观点,给哲学提出新的挑战。如果数智技术依赖于复制技术,那么意味着生命可以通过数字化被复制,这类观点亟须接受哲学的怀疑。然而,数智技术发展的前进势头和接受怀疑并不冲突。数字人要为“生命”正言,并获得数字形态就必须具备时间认知和空间认知的能力。这进一步表明,人类与数字人良好的交互前提必须考虑这两项认知能力。生命的数字形态以该前提为基础。
Amid the tension between predictions of artificial intelligence's omnipotence and the profound challenge posed by"Dreyfus's Question",a number of contentious philosophical issues surrounding digital intelligence technologies have emerged.Based on big data,intelligent algorithms and computing power,digital-intelligence technologies have given rise to novel forms of intelligent machines(or humans).Human cognitive agents are increasingly interacting with such machines.Among these developments,the use of digital technologies to"resurrect"deceased loved ones as virtual digital humans has led to the view that"digital humans are digital life",raising new philosophical challenges.If digital intelligence technologies rely on replication,then this implies that life itself can be reproduced digitally-an idea that urgently requires philosophical scrutiny.However,the forward momentum of digital-intelligence development is not incompatible with such scrutiny.For digital humans to be meaningfully regarded as"life"in digital form,they must possess both temporal and spatial cognition.This further suggests that effective human-digital human interaction depends on these two cognitive capacities.The digital form of life is grounded in this very premise.
出处
《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》
北大核心
2025年第4期33-42,共10页
Journal of Nankai University Philosophy,Literature and Social Science Edition
基金
国家社会科学基金西部项目(23XZX007)。
关键词
德雷福斯之问
认知个体
数字人
时间认知
空间认知
Dreyfus's Question
Cognitive Agents
Digital Humans
Temporal Cognition
Spatial Cognition
