摘要
透明性理论认为我们心灵的各种状态对于我们自身是透明的,一旦我们的心灵拥有内容,我们就能够对这些内容有所觉知。威廉姆森在论证知识的限度时对透明性理论进行了反驳,认为我们的认识要遵循误差余地原则,透明性理论所揭示的认知家园并不存在。现今主要存在着以下几种反驳威廉姆森论证的策略,包括没有区分透明性的类型与区分知识的类型。因此,即使承认我们只能有限度地获得知识,作为一个理性的主体,透明性理论依然是值得期待的。知识内省的特征使得我们能够跨出知识的限度,重建我们的认知家园。
Transparency theory holds that we have the special access to our own mind,we can have the awareness of our mental contents as soon as our mind have them. Williamson refutes the transparency theory when he argues for the limits of knowledge. He argues that our knowledge should follow the principle of margin for error,and the cognitive home does not exist. However,his argument is not sound,since we can find some defects: Firstly,he does not pay attention to the different interpretation of transparency;Secondly,he does not give the distinction between different types of knowledge,at the same time the source of knowledge is not taken into account. Therefore,even if we admit that we have only limited knowledge,as a rational subject,transparency theory is still can be hold in the way to pursue knowledge. The transparency of our mental state gives the introspective characteristics of knowledge,this feature allows us to step out of the limit of knowledge and to rebuild our cognitive home.
作者
吴程程
郑伟平
WU Cheng-cheng;ZHENG Wei-ping(Department of philosophy,Xiamen University,Xiamen Fujian 361005,China)
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第4期21-26,共6页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
关键词
认知家园
透明性理论
误差余地原则
KK原则
cognitive home
theory of transparency
margin for error principle
KK principle
