摘要
20世纪90年代以来,我国企业的高管薪酬水平和结构发生了重大变化,高管的薪酬水平竞相攀升,与内部员工收入差距越来越大,此现象引起了学界的广泛关注。为此,文章考察了我国制造业上市公司高管相对薪酬与企业绩效之间的关系。研究发现,高管市场相对薪酬、高管员工相对薪酬与企业绩效之间具有正相关关系,高管间相对薪酬与企业绩效之间具有负相关关系。产出风险降低了高管市场相对薪酬、高管员工相对薪酬的正向激励效应,减弱了高管间相对薪酬的负向效应。从企业所有制性质、行业、高管薪酬市场水平分组来看,所得结论基本一致,只是在显著性水平上略有差异。高管相对薪酬的激励效应受治理结构等多种因素影响,国有企业、融资结构、管理层持股比例、股权集中度具有正向促进作用,企业规模、董事长总经理兼职具有负向作用。新常态下,高管相对薪酬对企业绩效的影响出现了变化,其中高管间相对薪酬与企业绩效同样正相关,而产出风险的调节效应则不显著。研究结论对于企业的启示是,高管间相对薪酬过大的要缩小,反之则增加,合理扩大高管员工相对薪酬,量力而行采用高管市场相对薪酬制度,注意产出风险在薪酬制定中的逆向调节作用。
Since the 1990s,the executive compensation levels and structures of Chinese enterprises have undergone significant changes. The compensation levels of executives have been rising competitively,and the income gap between them and internal employees has been widening. This phenomenon has attracted attention. Therefore,this article examines the relationship between the relative compensation of executives and corporate performance in listed manufacturing companies in China. The study finds that there is a positive correlation between the relative compensation of executives in the market,the relative compensation of executives and employees,and corporate performance. There is a negative correlation between the relative compensation among executives and corporate performance. Output risk reduces the positive incentive effect of the relative compensation of executives in the market and the relative compensation of executives and employees,and weakens the negative effect of the relative compensation among executives. From the perspective of ownership,industry,and executive compensation market levels,the conclusions are basically consistent,with only slight differences in significance levels. The incentive effect of executive relative compensation is influenced by multiple factors such as governance structure,where state-owned enterprises,asset-liability ratio,management shareholding,and equity concentration have a positive promoting effect,while enterprise scale and the concurrent position of the chairman and manager have a negative effect. Under the new normal,the impact of executive relative compensation on corporate performance has changed. Among them,the relative compensation among executives is still positively correlated with corporate performance,while the moderating effect of output risk is not significant. Based on this,if the relative compensation among executives is too large,it should be reduced;otherwise,it should be increased. The relative compensation of executives and employees should be reasonably expanded. Market relative compensation policies should be adopted in a measured manner,and the reverse moderating effect of business risk in compensation determination should be noted.
出处
《吉林大学社会科学学报》
北大核心
2025年第3期95-111,236,共18页
Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(23&ZD083)。
关键词
高管相对薪酬
产出风险
企业绩效
激励效应
relative executive compensation
output risk
enterprise performance
incentive effect
