摘要
金融机构的经营表现,是组织决策者的决策行为偏好的直接体现,而不同决策行为的选择,又是金融机构内多方博弈和利益冲突平衡的结果。本文试图突破现有经典博弈论研究的完全理性假设,将组织决策者视作有限理性博弈方,将演化博弈论应用于对金融机构决策行为的分析上,并运用MATLAB软件通过数值仿真和求解模型构建,来演绎金融机构治理层(委托人)和高管层(代理人)两类组织决策群体间的决策策略选择、决策过程演化轨迹。研究发现:(1)金融机构治理层和高管层的决策策略选择会相互影响,并最终达到动态平衡;(2)当金融机构的决策审计机制越有效和组织情境越完善时,会增加高管层选择不当行为的额外成本,从而降低不当决策发生的概率;(3)金融机构治理层决策质量的提升,可有效降低高管层因不当决策而获得的额外利益,同时增加高管层的违规成本,会相应降低不当决策发生的概率。通过本研究,以期为金融监管部门及金融机构自身更好地监管和规避决策不当引发的行为风险提供更具针对性的措施建议。
The operational performance of financial institutions directly reflects the decision-making preferences of their decision-makers.The selection of different decision-making behaviors results from a multi-party game and the balance of conflicting interests within these institutions.This paper seeks to move beyond the traditional assumption of complete rationality in classical game theory by considering organizational decision-makers as boundedly rational players.It applies evolutionary game theory to analyze the decision-making behaviors within financial institutions.Using MATLAB software,numerical simulations and model constructions are employed to simulate the strategy selection and evolutionary trajectory of decision-making processes between two organizational decision-making groups:the governance layer(principal)and the senior management layer(agent).The results indicate that:(1)the decision-making strategies of governance and senior management influence each other and eventually reach a dynamic equilibrium;(2)a more effective decision-making audit mechanism and a well-structured organizational context increase the additional costs associated with executives'improper behavior,thereby reducing the likelihood of such decisions;(3)enhancing the quality of governance decision-making effectively diminishes the additional benefits senior management gains from improper decisions and raises the costs of violations,which correspondingly lowers the probability of improper decision-making.This study aims to provide targeted measures and recommendations to improve supervision and mitigate behavioral risks arising from improper decision-making in financial institutions.
作者
梁力军
张梦婉
戴佟昕
LIANG Lijun;ZHANG Mengwan;DAI Tongxin
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
北大核心
2025年第11期107-123,共17页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“多源数据融合下数字金融风险监测与防范机制研究”(项目编号:23BGL091)。
关键词
金融机构
组织决策
行为风险
演化博弈
组织决策审计
Financial institutions
Organizational decision-making
Behavioral risk
Evolutionary games
Organizational decision-making audits
