摘要
独立董事与监事会同属我国上市公司内部监督机构,二者的关系与协调一直是我国法学界的热点讨论问题,最新立法也对此予以了相当关注。根据两大制度分属的一元制与二元制公司治理的逻辑基础与立法例,其制度本身并无优劣之分。我国公司法在上市公司治理制度设计中,融合两大治理结构模式的优点,采取了“内外兼顾的双轨制”监督模式,但在具体实践中出现了职权重叠下的功能重复、独立性不足及反馈缺乏等问题。从相关实证研究与制度逻辑出发,基于我国现有制度安排与比较法的有益经验,我国独立董事制度与监事会制度须进一步协调与改革,以提升公司内部监督效果、完善公司治理。
Independent directors and board of supervisors are both internal supervisory bodies of listed companies in China,and their relationship and coordination have always been a hot topic of discussion in the legal field of China.The latest legislation have also given great concern to this issue.According to the logical basis and legislative examples of the two major systems of corporate governance,namely the unitary and binary systems,there is no distinction between their own advantages or disadvantages.In the design of the corporate governance system for listed companies in China,company law integrates the advantages of two major governance structure models and adopts a“dual track system”supervision model that takes into account both internal and external factors.However,in practice,there have been problems such as functional duplication,insufficient independence,and lack of feedback due to overlapping powers.Starting from relevant empirical research and institutional logic,and based on the existing institutional arrangements in China and the beneficial experience of comparative law,China’s independent director system and board of supervisors system should be further coordinated and reformed to enhance the effectiveness of internal supervision and improve corporate governance.
作者
南玉梅
聂丰
NAN Yumei;NIE Feng(School of Law,Wuhan University,Wuhan,Hubei 430072)
出处
《商学研究》
2024年第6期119-128,共10页
Commercial Science Research
关键词
独立董事
监事会
内部监督
公司治理
independent director
board of supervisors
internal supervision
corporate governance
