摘要
我们对我国上市公司监事会和经营绩效的关系进行回归分析 ,发现监事会的规模一般为 3或 5人 ,且监事会规模几乎不能影响公司的发展态势。监事会的持股比例、年度报酬与上市公司经营绩效的关系 ,与上市公司经营绩效不存在显著的正相关关系。同时我国上市公司监事会的召集人更多地是一种名誉性的职务 ,服务全体股东的意识不强。在某种程度上 ,正是经理阶层的强势地位使得监事会处于弱势 ,我们认为随着职业经理层的兴起以及机构投资者队伍的扩大和实力的增强 ,将会有力地改善监事会的这种“跛脚地位”
This paper makes an empirical analysis on the supervisory board and the performance of Chinesed listed companies.In terms of sample statistics,we discover that the number of the supervisory board is generally about 3 or 5,almost cannot influence the performance of listed companies.We also study the relationship between the proportion of shares and yearly salary of the supervisory board and the performance of Chinese listed companies,and find out that the number and proportion of shares and the salary of the supervisory board hasn't remarkable positive correlation with the performance of Chinese listed companies.In order to change status of the supervisory board,we must enlarge and enhance both the strength and size of the institutional investors.
出处
《吉林省经济管理干部学院学报》
2001年第6期6-9,共4页
Journal of Jilin Province Economic Management Cadre College
