摘要
以中国A股上市公司的数据为样本,从独立董事存在自愿持有受聘上市公司股份的基本事实出发,通过理论分析提出以下假设:持股独立董事的行为逻辑更符合中国独立董事制度设计的初衷,即持股独立董事能更多地独立于管理层和大股东,从而更好地发挥监督职能。实证结果显示,在有独立董事持股的公司,独立董事更多地发表反对意见,从而证明持股独立董事确实更积极地履行了监督职责。进一步检验显示:独立董事持股不仅降低了管理费用率,而且在股权制衡水平较低时更倾向于发表反对意见,并且能更好地约束大股东掏空行为,即独立董事持股对第一类和第二类代理问题均起到了更好的治理效果。采用倾向得分匹配法控制内生性问题后,实证结论依然成立。以上经验证据既是对独立董事持股现象的经济后果的探究和检验,又是关于在中国制度背景下如何提升独立董事独立性的剖析与思考。
Taking the data of China's A-share listed companies as samples and starting from the basic fact that the independent directors are willing to hold the shares of the listed companies that hire them,this paper conducts a theoretic analysis and proposes the following assumption that the behavior logic of the share-holding independent directors is more aligned with the original intention of the design of China’s independent director system,i.e.,the share-holding independent directors can be more independent of the management and the big shareholders,thereby performing their supervisory duties better.The empirical results show that in the companies with share-holding independent directors,the independent directors will express more dissenting opinions,which proves that the share-holding independent directors do perform their supervising duties more actively.Further analysis reveals that independent directors’shareholding can not only reduce management expense ratio,but also be more likely to deliver dissenting opinions when the company has lower level of equity balance.It can better restrict the tunneling behavior of the large shareholders,i.e.,the share-holding of the independent directors can have a better governance effect on the agency problems of both the first and second types.The empirical conclusion is still valid after the PSM method is used to control the problem of endogeneity.The above empirical evidences are both the explorations and tests of the economic consequences of the independent directors'shareholding phenomenon,and also the analysis and reflection of the problem of how to enhance the independence of independent directors in the context of China’s institution.
作者
邓博夫
董雅浩
DENG Bo-fu;DONG Ya-hao(Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)
出处
《当代财经》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第1期73-85,共13页
Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“企业获奖与薪酬契约有效性研究”(71902161)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目“精准扶贫与企业慈善行为研究”(18YJA630041)。
关键词
独立董事
独董持股
独立性
激励相容
independent director
shareholdings of independent directors
independence
incentive compatibility
