摘要
对经理人能否抑制大股东的掏空行为,现有文献鲜有研究。本文基于经理人异质性的分析视角,按照独立性将经理分为一体型、依附型和独立型三种类型,在此基础上构建博弈模型分析不同类型的经理对大股东掏空行为以及对公司价值的影响,并以中国上市公司的数据进行实证检验。研究发现:独立型经理能够对大股东掏空产生有效的抑制,依附型经理对掏空有一定的抑制作用,而一体型经理则会激励大股东掏空。同时,通过将掏空和非正常在职消费置于同一框架下进行分析发现,经理人的非正常在职消费程度随着其独立性的提高而降低,经理人追逐非正常在职消费的动机越强越有可能与大股东形成合谋进而加剧掏空。本文还发现,公司价值与经理人独立性呈正相关关系。因此,经理人的独立性可能是一种有效的公司治理机制,可在抑制大股东掏空及提升公司价值方面发挥积极作用。
Few literatures has studied the effect of manager on restricting the tunneling behavior. This paper classifies the managers into three types based on their independency, and builds up the models to theoretically and empirically analyze the effects of different manager＇s behaviors on tunneling and firm value. The results show that： the degree of tunneling is negatively correlated with manager＇s independency. The independent manager can restrict the tunneling behavior most effectively, and the second is dependent manager, while the integrated manager would encourage expropriation. Meanwhile, the manager＇s independency is negatively correlated with abnormal perks but is positively correlated with firm value ; and the degree of tunneling and abnormal perks is positively correlated, which indicates the reason for different types of manager to take different actions in tunneling. Therefore, the manager＇s independency can be an effective corporate governance mechanism, which can restrict tunneling and improve firm value.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期129-145,共17页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家社科基金重点项目(11AJY013)
广东省教育厅重大攻关项目(11ZGXM79004)的资助
