摘要
朱熹以接续儒门道统为己任,历来被学者推尊为“中古第一人”和“集大成”者。牟宗三以心体与性体为准则认为朱子在本体、工夫和文本三方面不能契合儒门真精神,故判为“歧出”旁枝。首先,牟宗三以朱熹“格物穷理”论为基点申斥其求理于外,认为朱子所言道德本体“只存有不活动”,理之实践性和动态性丧失;其次,批判朱子顺取格物的工夫路径,认为以本心求外物乃认知之心,心之本体性和道德性弱化;最后,认为朱子进行义理阐发所据文本全然以《大学》为中轴,偏离儒之正宗以“四书”为中心的思路,故判其为“别子为宗”。事实上,牟宗三以上论断与朱子本意相差甚远。朱子思想重心非以《大学》为本,其所言之理乃即存有即活动的一体两面之理,其工夫乃逆觉与格物他律自律相得益彰,在此基础上对牟宗三“别子为宗”进行检视和反思。
Zhu Xi took the succession of Confucianism as his duty.The new theory of Mou Zongsan’s unique standard,based on the criterion of“Xin Ti and Xing Ti”,holds that Zhu Xi can’t fit the true spirit of Confucianism in three aspects:ontology,congfu theory and text.Firstly,Mou Zongsan criticizes Zhu Xi’s for seeking Li from the outside,according to his theory of“Ge Wu Qiong Li”,thinks that Zhu Xi’s moral ontology is only exists and the practical and dynamic nature of Li is lost.Second,Mou Zongsan condemning the theory of seeking Li from outside thinks that the heart can only realize what the things is,and it cannot know what the heart is,so the noumenon and morality of heart are lost.Finally,the text of Da Xue on which Zhu Xi’s theoretical interpretation is based deviates from Confucianism of“Four Books”,so that the theory is criticized as“Bie Zi Wei Zong”.In fact,Mou Zongsan's argument is greatly different from Zhu Xi's original intention.Zhu Xi's ideological focus is not based on Da Xue.The principle that Zhu Xi said is the two-sided principle of existence and activity.His work is that adversity and heterogeneous discipline and self-discipline complement each other.Mou Zongsan's“Bie Zi Wei Zong”theory should be examined and reflected on this basis.
作者
王向清
李恩润
WANG Xiangqing;LI Enrun(Department of Philosophy,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan Hunan 411105,China)
出处
《湖南工业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2020年第5期1-7,132,共8页
Journal of Hunan University of Technology(Social Science Edition)
关键词
别子为宗
《大学》
“四书”
存有与活动
逆觉体证
格物穷理
Bie Zi Wei Zong
Da Xue
“Four Books”
existence and activity
physical signs of adversity
truth exploration
