摘要
康德之后,德国唯心论致力于将理性自身论证为世界的实体和本原,并将世界的展开论证为理性自身运动的后果,也即致力于构造出一种理性的内在性总体科学。但是这一方案却内在地忽略了这样一个重大问题:世界和理性终归是存在而非不存在,这一事实的动力何在?“为什么毕竟有某物存在,为什么无不存在?”这一问题不仅指向一种后唯心论视野下人们对于存在与自由的更高理解,也让谢林在与近代哲学传统和黑格尔的争辩中超越德国唯心论的理性内在性方案,提出了“逻辑性—否定哲学”和“历史性—肯定哲学”的区分,进而开辟了德国唯心论的新路向。
After Kant,the all-encompassing task of German idealism was to justify reason itself as the substance and principle of the world,and to justify the unfolding of the world as the consequence of the activity of reason itself;that is,to construct a rational,immanent,and complete science.But the ultimate question begged by this proposed solution is,what motivates the fact that the world and reason exist rather than do not?That is,“why is there something rather than nothing?”This problem not only points to a higher understanding of existence and freedom from the perspective of meta-idealism,but also boosted Schelling beyond the rational internalism of German idealism,letting him put forward the distinction between“the logical-negative philosophy”and“the historic-positive philosophy”,thereby opening up another path for German idealism.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第9期98-107,F0003,共11页
Philosophical Research
基金
教育部基地重大项目“谢林著作集的翻译与研究”(编号15JJD720002)的阶段性成果。
