摘要
本文基于2006-2012年审计师向监管部门报备的客户利润调整数据,观察在股票期权激励前一年,审计师是否会调整利润以满足客户的低盈余需求。研究发现,当调整金额在重要性水平范围内时,审计师会降低利润上调的概率和幅度,而客户会支付更高的审计费用。与上调利润相比,若审计师未上调利润,则审计收费更高。本文利用独特数据,发现了审计师会在风险可控范围内迎合客户需求,打开了审计师与客户互动的“黑箱”。建议监管部门关注股票期权激励下审计调整数据的合理性。
Based on the earnings adjustment data reported by auditors to regulators in 2006 to 2012,we explore whether the auditor will meet managers'low-earnings needs by ad-justing earnings in the year before executive stock option incentive.We find that when the a mount of earnings adjustment is lower than the materiality level,auditors would decrease the probability and extent of upward earnings adjustment.In return,clients would pay more audit fees.Compared with the auditor that adjust earnings upward,auditors with natural and downward earnings adjustment have more audit fees.Using the unique data,we find auditors would meet clients'requirements when audit risk in a controllable range,and open the black box of interaction between auditors and clients.It is suggested that regulators should pay at-tention to the reasonableness of audit adjustment data when clients implement the executive stock option incentive.
作者
陈宋生
曹圆圆
李文颖
Songsheng Chen;Yuanyuan Cao;Wenying Li
出处
《中国会计评论》
2020年第1期153-190,共38页
China Accounting Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71672009,71972011)
国家社会科学基金重点项目(18ATJ003)的阶段性成果。
关键词
审计调整
股票期权激励
审计师行为
重要性水平
Audit Adjustment
Stock Option Incentive
Auditors'Behavior
Materiality Level
