摘要
近年来,审计合谋呈现蔓延趋势,并且随着审计市场竞争的加剧而愈演愈烈。从历史视角考察美国和中国审计市场竞争状态与审计合谋的联系后可以看出,审计合谋源于审计市场的过度竞争。一个无限重复博弈模型证明:在没有过度竞争的审计市场上,无合谋均衡是可以达到的;而过度竞争将难以避免合谋均衡。防范审计合谋的一种可选政策就是对审计市场进行干预,防止审计市场的过度竞争,建设高效率的监管体制。
Reeently, there is a tendency that collusion in auditing spreads and gets more and more intense with the competition in auditing market. From the historical perspective, by analyzing the effect of competition in auditing markets of USA and China on collusive behavior in auditing, this paper points out that auditing collusion may rise from over-competition in auditing market. Then we develop an infinite repetitive game model and show that, collusion-free equilibrium can be reached when the auditing market is far from over-competition; and the over-competition will lead to collusive disequilibrium. It is necessary for us to intervene in auditing market, depress the competition in this field and construct an effective supervisory system to avoid the emergence of auditing collusion.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第5期27-32,共6页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
广东省高校学科建设创新团队重大项目(C100082)
关键词
注册会计师审计
审计合谋
审计市场竞争
重复博弈
产业组织
CPA auditing
auditing collusion
market auditing competition
repeated game
industrial organization
